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An Empirical Study of Whistleblower Policies in United States
Corporate Codes of Ethics
Richard Moberly & Lindsey E. Wylie
Companies have issued Codes of Ethics (also called Codes of Conduct) for decades, and
these Codes increasingly have contained provisions related to whistleblowing. For example,
Codes often encourage or even require corporate employees to report incidents of
misconduct they witness. Code provisions describe the types of misconduct employees
should report and provide numerous ways for employees to make reports. Moreover,
companies use Codes to promise employees that they will not retaliate against
whistleblowers. Indeed, because these whistleblowing provisions have become an important
part of a corporation’s internal control and risk management systems, they merit closer
examination to determine exactly what they require and promise. Accordingly, this chapter
describes the results of the first comprehensive empirical study of whistleblower provisions
contained in United States corporate Codes of Ethics.
Section 1 of the chapter provides a brief history of whistleblower provisions and Codes of
Ethics. Although companies once issued Codes voluntarily, beginning in the 1990s,
companies received substantial legal incentives to issue Codes, resulting in an explosion in
popularity. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, however, for the first time required publiclytraded companies in the United States to issue Codes. Subsequent regulation mandated
that these Codes contain, among other things, provisions related to encouraging and
protecting whistleblowers.
Section 2 describes the methodology from a study of these whistleblower provisions. This
study replicates and extends previous studies while also utilizing a methodology that
distinguishes it from its predecessors. By focusing on companies listed on U.S. stock
exchanges, this study provides an important extension of previous studies, which focused on
whistleblower provisions in corporate Codes of European companies (Hassink et al. 2007)
and of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (D. Lewis & Kender 2007; D. Lewis
& Kender 2010). However, in contrast to the methodology utilized by those prior studies,
which relied on self-selected responses to surveys, this study used public documents to
obtain Codes from a stratified sample of 90 publicly-traded companies. We examined over
100 variables related to the whistleblower policies we located.
We present the results of the study in Appendix A, and we discuss some of the more
interesting findings in Section 3 of the chapter. First, the results indicate that a consensus
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has emerged among U.S. corporations regarding the scope and content of the whistleblower
provisions in their Codes. Second, these provisions may provide broader and better
whistleblower protection than current U.S. statutory and tort law. This conclusion, however,
is subject to the considerable qualification that whistleblowers may be unable to enforce
many, if not most, of these provisions because of the prevalence of the at-will rule in U.S.
employment law.
Finally, Section 4 of the chapter discusses some of the study’s limitations and presents
some suggestions for further research.

1. Whistleblower Provisions in Codes of Ethics5
In the 1970s, U.S. corporations voluntarily adopted broad corporate Codes of Ethics in
response to various scandals of the time, including bribery of foreign government officials,
fraud and overbilling in the defense industry, and insider-trading allegations. (Pitt &
Groskaufmanis 1990, pp.1582-99; Krawiec 2003, p.497) These Codes proscribed a wide
range of illegal conduct to send a message to outsiders (such as shareholders and
government regulators) that companies were addressing potential problems, and also to
clarify legal boundaries for their employees. (Berenbeim 1987, pp.13-14; Jackall 2007,
p.1134; Pagnattaro & Peirce 2007, pp.383-84) However, these early Codes rarely included
whistleblower provisions or identified how employees could report corporate misconduct.
(Moberly 2008, p.990)
The federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG), which the U.S. government
released in 1991, changed the emphasis corporations placed on Codes of Ethics because
the OSG provided reduced penalties for a corporate criminal defendant that could
demonstrate it implemented an ‘effective’ compliance system prior to engaging in
misconduct. (Krawiec 2003, pp.498-99; Pagnattaro & Peirce 2007, p.384) Issuing a
corporate Code of Ethics became an important way for corporations to demonstrate the
effectiveness of its compliance system, in large part because the OSG’s commentary section
specifically suggested that companies must communicate their ethical regulations to its
employees. (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 1991, s. 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k)(5))
Moreover, in 2004, the OSG expanded the requirements for an ‘effective’ system to
specifically mandate that organizations publicize a system for employees to ‘report or seek
guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct.’ (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual 2004, s. 8B2.1(b)(4)(A)) The OSG also required that companies offer a reporting
system that employees can use ‘without fear of retaliation.’ (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
5

Parts of this section summarize a history of Codes of Ethics presented more fully in Richard Moberly, Protecting
Whistleblowers By Contract, 79 COLO. L. REV. 975, 988-95 (2008).
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Manual 2004, s. 8B2.1(b)(5)(C)) These OSG requirements naturally led corporations to use
Codes both to communicate the companies’ expectations to their employees and to inform
their employees that they would not be retaliated against if they reported wrongdoing to the
company.
A series of court cases in the 1990s supplemented the OSG incentives to use Codes of
Ethics as part of an overall legal compliance system. For example, the Delaware Chancery
Court held that a corporate director could avoid a breach of fiduciary duty of care claim if the
director implemented a sufficient ‘corporate information and reporting system.’ (In re
Caremark Int’l Inc. 1996, p.970) Further, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a
company that implemented an internal grievance procedure would have an affirmative
defense to sexual harassment claims. (Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth 1998, p.765,
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 1998, p.807) Later, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission advised that grievance systems would not satisfy the Supreme Court’s test
unless the employer ‘make[s] clear that it will not tolerate adverse treatment of employees
because they report harassment or provide information related to such complaints.’ (U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1999) Ultimately by the year 2000, corporate
‘best practices’ for internal reporting systems included a ‘comprehensive whistleblower policy
that encouraged employees to report misconduct and that included a promise not to retaliate
against them.’ (Moberly 2008, p.993) Indeed, at least one survey of human resources
professionals, conducted in 1993, found that about two-thirds of companies with internal
disclosure policies promised protection from retaliation for employee whistleblowers. (Barnett
et al. 1993, p.131)
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 brought new attention to corporate Codes
and to the importance of whistleblowing. Section 301 required every publicly-traded
company to provide an anonymous route for employees to disclose questionable accounting
or auditing matters to the company’s audit committee. (15 U.S.C. s. 78f(m)(4)) Section 406
of the Act required publicly-traded companies to disclose whether the company had a Code
of Ethics that applied to senior financial officers, and, if it did not have such a Code, to
provide a public explanation of why it did not. (15 U.S.C. s. 7264(a)) Subsequently, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued regulations under the Act that expanded
upon these baseline statutory requirements in three significant ways. First, companies must
disclose Codes applying to principal executive officers as well as to senior financial officers.
Second, the regulations expanded Sarbanes-Oxley’s definition of ‘Code of Ethics’ to include
written standards that promote the ‘prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an
appropriate person or persons identified in the code.’ Third, companies must provide their
Codes of Ethics to the public in one of three ways: as an exhibit to its publicly available
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annual report, by posting it on its website, or by providing a copy without charge to any
person requesting it. (17 C.F.R. s. 229.406)
The SEC also asked the U.S. stock exchanges to evaluate their listing standards related to
corporate governance. In response, three of the largest stock exchanges issued new listing
standards that, among other things, made new requirements of listed companies related to
whistleblowing policies and Codes of Ethics. Interestingly, although the exchanges
promulgated similar standards, they all vary in significant ways from each other, as well as
from Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory requirement and the SEC’s regulatory rules.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) now requires its listed companies to issue a Code of
Ethics that applies to all its directors, officers, and employees – a significant change from
Sarbanes-Oxley’s application of Codes to senior financial officers. The NYSE also states
that corporate Codes should ‘encourage’ good faith reporting of ‘violations of laws, rules,
regulations or the code of business conduct’ to ‘supervisors, managers or other appropriate
personnel.’ (on ‘good faith’ see section IV below) Codes also should encourage reports
when an employee is ‘in doubt about the best course of action in a particular situation.’ With
regard to protections for whistleblowers, the NYSE requires that the ‘company must ensure
that employees know that the company will not allow retaliation.’ NYSE companies must
make the Code of Ethics available on the company’s website or in print to any shareholder
who requests it. (NYSE Listing Manual, s. 303A10)
The NASDAQ makes similar, but slightly different, requirements of its listed companies. Like
the NYSE, NASDAQ company Codes must apply to all directors, officers, and employees
and the Code must ensure ‘prompt and consistent enforcement of the code’ by encouraging
the reporting of violations and protecting from retaliation persons who report ‘questionable
behavior.’ However, the NASDAQ rules provide fewer specifics than the NYSE requirements.
For example, the NASDAQ rules do not explicitly protect ‘good faith’ reports, nor do they
provide a detailed definition of the type of misconduct that should be reported. Also, the
NASDAQ rules do not mandate to whom whistleblower reports should go. Finally, NASDAQ
companies only have to make the Code ‘publicly available’ – the NASDAQ rules do not
require posting to the company website. (NASDAQ Interpretative Manual Online, s. IM-43507)
Finally, the American Stock Exchange (AmEx) took a different approach by not expanding
significantly upon the SEC regulations. Other than requiring its listed corporations to apply
their Codes of Ethics to all directors, officers, and employees (similarly to the NYSE and
NASDAQ), the AmEx requirements simply mirrored the SEC regulations by mandating a
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Code of Ethics that requires reporting violations of the Code to ‘an appropriate person.’6
Although companies must make the Code ‘publicly available,’ the AmEx standards did not
mention protection from retaliation. (AmEx Company Guide, s. 807)
By 2007, then, the combination of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC regulations, and the stock
exchange listing standards effectively moved the corporate practice of producing a Code of
Ethics from a voluntary or incentive-based system to a mandatory requirement for publiclytraded companies. (Moberly 2008, pp.988-95) Furthermore, the stock exchange listing
standards required companies to encourage employees to report misconduct through
whistleblower reporting channels described in corporate Codes of Ethics. In addition, new
mandatory provisions of the NYSE and the NASDAQ went even further by requiring
company Codes to include a promise to protect employees from retaliation for reporting
corporate misconduct through those internal channels.

2. Methodology
This study used content analysis to examine the types of protections provided by U.S.
corporate Codes of Ethics now that these substantial changes have had time to take effect.
It differs from previous studies of Codes of Ethics in two important ways. First, most other
studies of Codes catalog various provisions contained in Codes of Ethics generally. This
study focuses discretely on a Code’s whistleblower provisions. Only two other studies of
corporate Codes have a similarly narrow focus. Hassink, et al. examined whistleblower
provisions issued by European companies, and Lewis and Kender have on two separate
occasions examined provisions issued by companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.
(Hassink et al. 2007; D. Lewis & Kender 2007; D. Lewis & Kender 2010) This study provides
an important extension of those studies by focusing on companies listed on U.S. stock
exchanges.
Second, this study’s methodology differs from Hassink and from Lewis & Kender. The
Hassink study sent emails to the largest European listed companies asking whether they
had a whistleblower protection program and, if so, whether the company would send the text
of the program. The researchers accepted specific policy documents as well as Codes of
Conduct with a whistleblower provision. After receiving a response rate of 25%, the authors
added whistleblower polices from 26 other companies listed on the Dutch AEX index and the
SWX Swiss exchange, bringing their total sample size to 56 companies. (Hassink et al. 2007,
p.31) Lewis and Kender’s studies sent questionnaires to companies on the FTSE 250, which
contains the 101st to the 350th largest companies with their primary listing on the London

6

In 2008, after this study was completed, the NYSE purchased the AmEx.
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Stock Exchange. In 2007, 32% of the companies responded with information about their
whistleblowing procedures, (D. Lewis & Kender 2007, p.9), while the 2010 survey had a
slightly lower response rate of 26% (D. Lewis & Kender 2010, pp.8-9).
The current study, by contrast, used public documents to obtain Codes from a randomlyselected sample of thirty publicly-traded companies from each of the three largest U.S. stock
exchanges, the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and the AmEx, providing a sample of ninety
companies. The random sample was obtained from a list generated by searches of annual
SEC filings for the calendar year 2007. The searches were run on 10kwizard.com, a feebased subscription service that collects corporate filings. We found the company Codes in
each company’s annual filing (called the Form 10-K or 10-KSB, collectively the ‘Form 10s’)
or on the company’s website.
The first author developed a Code Book containing numerous variables, many of which were
based on variables used in Hassink’s study of whistleblower provisions in European Codes.
(Hassink et al. 2007) The Codes were examined with regard to their (1) general content,
scope, and tone; (2) the nature of the corporate violations that whistleblowers were
instructed to report; (3) the officials to whom the Codes indicate that wrongdoing should be
reported; (4) any reporting guidelines or formalities; (5) any provisions related to
confidentiality or anonymity; (6) the extent of the protection from retaliation provided by the
Codes; and (7) details regarding the investigation of any whistleblower report.
After extensive training, two research assistants (RAs), both upper-class law students at a
Midwestern law school, reviewed and coded each Form 10 and Code from all the companies
contained in the sample. Their inter-coder reliability for all ninety cases across all the
variables was 92.4%. After the coding, the two RAs met and resolved the differences for the
remaining variables. When they were unable to reach an agreement, the first author
determined the code that would be used in the study. Although Form 10s for all ninety
companies were examined, one AmEx company refused to provide its Code of Ethics, so
coders ultimately examined eighty-nine Codes of Ethics.

3. Discussion
Appendix A provides a table with the frequency distribution for the variables mentioned
above. This section will highlight two of the more interesting findings from the study.
An Emerging Consensus
First, the results indicate that U.S. corporations have developed a consensus regarding the
contents and scope of whistleblower provisions in corporate Codes. This consensus has
emerged despite the facts that U.S. statutory and regulatory law provides little guidance
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regarding the Codes’ contents, and that the stock exchanges differ widely on the
requirements they impose upon corporations.
Who Do the Codes Cover?
As noted above, Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC regulations, and the stock exchange listing
requirements all contain slightly different mandates on who should be covered by a
company’s Code of Ethics. Sarbanes-Oxley mentions only senior financial officers, the SEC
regulations add principal executive officers, and all three stock exchanges require the Code
to cover ‘all directors, officers, and employees.’ The majority of Codes comply with the stock
exchanges’ broad requirements: 98.9% cover all employees, 78.7% cover officers and
senior management, and 82.0% cover directors. Interestingly, only 22.5% of the Codes
specifically cover ‘financial officers,’ the one group mentioned by both Sarbanes-Oxley and
the SEC regulations. About a quarter of the Codes (25.8%) permit contractors (i.e. people
who are not ‘employees’ but provide work for the company, such as self-employed
consultants) to report wrongdoing and over half (53.9%) explicitly mention that the Code
covers subsidiary corporations or the entire corporate family of companies.
Is Reporting Required or Encouraged?
Although some exceptions exist, the law rarely requires employees (or any individual) to
report illegal behavior. (Tippett 2007, pp.11-12; Feldman & Lobel 2010, pp.1163-67;
Tsahuridu & Vandekerckhove 2008, p.108) The SEC follows this norm and only mandates
that companies ‘promote’ internal reporting of misconduct. U.S. corporations, however, have
responded to this regulatory mandate by going beyond merely ‘promoting’ whistleblowing.
Instead, corporations require employees to report misconduct: 96.6% of these Codes make
whistleblowing a duty of employment. Thirty-six percent also ‘encourage’ employees to
report misconduct. In other words, U.S. companies recognize the importance of
whistleblowing to their own internal control mechanisms by demanding that every employee
become a whistleblower if the employee witnesses misconduct.
What Violations Matter to the Companies?
Whistleblowers must always determine whether the misconduct they witness is the type of
wrongdoing the company wants reported and whether the company will protect them for
disclosing. To resolve the question of what violations should be reported, the SEC and the
listing standards provide a variety of suggestions. The SEC states that ‘violations of the
code’ should be reported - no other types of misconduct, such as illegal or unethical
behavior, are mentioned. As for the listing standards, the NYSE requires companies to
encourage reports of ‘violations of laws, rules, regulations or the Code of business conduct’
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and the NASDAQ encourages reports of ‘questionable behavior.’ The AmEx simply adopts
the SEC regulation approach by addressing only reports of Code violations.
A large percentage of companies (93.3%) follow the SEC regulations precisely and indicate
that the misconduct to be reported are violations of the Code itself. However, many
companies expand this basic requirement and require employees to report a broader range
of wrongdoing. For example, 76.4% broaden the reporting requirement to include violations
of the law or regulations and more than half (52.8%) mandate reporting ‘unethical’ or
‘improper’ conduct. Taken together, the Codes’ requirement that employees report violations
of the Code, illegal conduct, and unethical behavior indicate that companies want employees
to report an extremely broad range of potential misconduct. Perhaps not coincidentally,
these three areas mirror the seminal definition of ‘whistleblowing’ set forth by Janet Near and
Marcia Miceli in 1985: whistleblowing involves the reporting of ‘illegal, immoral, or
illegitimate’ behavior. (Near & Miceli 1985, p.4)
Interestingly, many corporations went beyond these general instructions to point out specific
types of misconduct that should be reported. These categories may shed some light on the
type of misconduct corporations truly think will be beneficial to have reported. Indeed, from
one perspective, the Codes identify specific areas to be reported that align with the
corporation’s self-interest. For example, the most frequently identified misconduct to be
reported was conflicts of interest – either one’s own conflict or the conflict of others – by
79.8% of the Codes. This outcome was followed by requests that employees report ‘financial
reporting problems, including accounting, internal controls or auditing problems’ – by 65.2%
of the Codes – and fraud (36.0%). By contrast, Codes did not identify areas that might have
broad societal benefits nearly as frequently. Health and safety issues were the highest
(29.2%), but other areas were remarkably low, such as environmental issues (7.9%),
criminal offenses (3.4%), insider trading, bribery, and money laundering (9.0%).
Only 21.3% of the Codes identified harassment and discrimination as problems that should
be reported. This result seems low, because a pair of 1998 U.S. Supreme Court cases gave
companies who implement internal reporting mechanisms for complaints about harassment
an affirmative defense in cases in which harassment has been alleged. (Burlington Indus.Inc.
v. Ellerth 1998, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 1998) The conventional wisdom after those
cases was that companies would implement complaint channels in order to utilize the
affirmative defense. (Callahan et al. 2002, pp.192-93; Sturm 2001, p.557) According to the
results of this study, although companies utilize complaint channels, only about 1 in 5
specifically identify harassment as one of the problems that should be reported. One
explanation may be that procedures for harassment complaints are identified more
thoroughly in other documents, such as an employee handbook.
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Who Should Receive Reports of Misconduct?
The SEC regulations and the AmEx listing standards are vague on who should receive
reports of misconduct. Both state that reports should be made to ‘an appropriate person …
identified in the code.’ The NASDAQ standard does not identify a person to receive reports,
while the NYSE states that reporting should be to ‘supervisors, managers, or other
appropriate personnel.’ Given this variety among different regulatory regimes, the study
examined who Codes said should receive a whistleblower’s disclosure of wrongdoing.
Contrary to the vagueness of the SEC Regulations, as well as the AmEx and NASDAQ
listing standards, many Codes listed several possible recipients of whistleblower reports,
either as a primary contact for whistleblowers or a secondary option. By far the most popular
person identified as a potential recipient is the employee’s supervisor, who was listed in
75.3% of the Codes. This result seems to indicate that corporations, by and large, would still
prefer that employees make whistleblower reports through the chain of command. Perhaps
not coincidentally, employees tend to prefer reporting to supervisors as well: one recent
survey found that 46% of whistleblowing reports were given to supervisors, far more than
any other source. (Ethics Resource Center 2010, p.5)
Two types of recipients were listed by almost half of the Codes: the corporate audit
committee (55.1%) and an employee hotline (47.2%). The popularity of these options may
be a reflection of Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that publicly-traded companies provide a
disclosure channel directly to the company’s audit committee. (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
s. 301) On the other hand, a 1999 study of Fortune 1000 companies found that 51% of those
companies had an ethics hotline for employees to report misconduct before Sarbanes-Oxley
was passed in 2002. (Weaver et al. 1999, p.290)
Moberly has theorized that a disclosure channel like a hotline should increase the number
and quality of whistleblower disclosures over time. (Moberly 2006, pp.1141-50) Whether this
is true remains to be seen, as hotlines have received mixed reception from actual employee
whistleblowers. For example, the same survey mentioned above found that only about 3% of
internal reports of misconduct went to company hotlines. (Ethics Resource Center 2010, p.5)
Regardless, clearly some corporations have adopted this approach and begun advertising
their hotlines through their Codes of Ethics. Indeed, some scholars have indicated that
companies have responded to Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement by contracting with an
independent, third-party hotline to receive employee reports. (Miceli et al. 2008, p.158) This
study confirms that view in part, as many (36.7%) of the companies that indicated a hotline
should receive an employee report also indicated that the hotline was managed by a thirdparty. That said, more than half (57.1%) of the companies that mentioned a hotline did not

Whistleblowing and Democratic Values

36

provide any contact details for the hotline, which seems to undermine the company’s
reliance on this channel to receive valuable information.
We also examined whether companies listed recipients of whistleblowing reports as ‘primary’
or ‘secondary’ options, because often companies mention that reports should first be made
to a particular recipient, but then could also be made to others. In fact, 98.9% of the
companies mention a secondary contact. However, about 2/3 of the companies did not
provide any reason for reporting to a secondary contact.
Of the remaining companies, we examined when companies told their employees a
secondary contact should be used. The most frequent response was if the whistleblower felt
‘uncomfortable’ or wanted ‘anonymity’ (58.6%). Other reasons, in descending order of
frequency were:
•

if the whistleblower thought that after reporting to the primary contact, the report was

not handled ‘properly’ or if the whistleblower was not ‘satisfied’ with the response from the
primary contact (48.3%);
•

if the primary contact was not ‘appropriate’ or if there were difficulties with

‘communication’ (34.5%);
•

the absence of a primary contact (for example, if the committee does not exist);

(10.3%);
•

if the report contains a serious violation of the law (3.4%).

Not surprisingly, all of the Codes focused almost exclusively on internal recipients. (Only two
of the 89 Codes mentioned an external recipient, such as a regulatory authority or Congress.)
Although scholars debate whether whistleblowers should report internally or externally, it
clearly is in a corporation’s best interest to encourage internal reports. (Callahan et al. 2002,
p.195) Corporations can address wrongdoing at an earlier stage and perhaps avoid negative
publicity that can surround disclosure of illegal behavior. (Dworkin & Callahan 1991, pp.30001) Additionally, by providing employees with direction on how to report internally,
companies may avoid employees going externally in the first place. As Janet Near and
Marcia Miceli have noted, ‘[p]reliminary research evidence indicates that whistle-blowers use
external channels when they don’t know about the internal channels and when they think the
external channels will afford them protection from retaliation.’ (Near & Miceli 1996, p.515)
Moreover, studies demonstrate that employees typically are better off reporting internally
because internal whistleblowers experience less retaliation than external whistleblowers.
(Dworkin & Callahan 1991, pp.301-02)
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The results also indicate that perhaps employees receive confusing message on who should
receive a whistleblowing report. Over two-thirds of the Codes provide different recipients for
reports depending on a variety of factors. Over half (56.2%) vary the recipient by the type of
misconduct being reported. For example, 49.4% of the companies identify a special contact
for reporting financial problems specifically. Some vary by who is engaging in misconduct
(14.6%), while others vary because of who is doing the reporting (18.0%). That said, some
variability is beneficial. For example, as noted above, numerous companies provided a
secondary contact to whom a whistleblower could report if the whistleblower was not
comfortable with the primary person identified or the whistleblower was not satisfied with the
response from the primary option. Having several options – such as a supervisor, HR
manager, and hotline – is important so that employees can avoid what Moberly has called
the ‘blocking and filtering of whistleblower reports’ that often describe the reaction of middle
management to whistleblower reports. (Moberly 2006, p.1121)
Do Companies Promise Not to Retaliate Against Whistleblowers?
Almost all (91.0%) of the companies either promise that the company will not retaliate
against an employee whistleblower or affirmatively prohibit retaliation against whistleblowers.
Almost one-third (30.3%) also state that the company will punish anyone who retaliates
against a whistleblower. These promises go well beyond anything required by SarbanesOxley or the SEC, neither of which require any sort of corporate promise regarding
retaliation.7 Of the stock exchanges examined by the study, the NYSE and the NASDAQ
explicitly mention that Codes of Conduct should include protection from retaliation.
None of the legal sources, however, give much guidance on the type of reports that will
receive protection. Only the NYSE states that reports should be made in ‘good faith’ – no
other listing exchange makes any other requirement. In that vacuum, companies seem to be
incorporating several consistent practices. Over three-fourths of the companies (76.4%)
adopt the NYSE ‘good faith’ requirement, while only 11.2% use the more rigorous
‘reasonable belief’ standard found in many whistleblower statutes. Companies claim to
protect reports of ‘suspected’ violations (68.5%) as well. In addition to these carrots,
companies use the stick as well: 21.3% state that they will punish false or malicious reports.
Are Confidentiality or Anonymity Guaranteed?
Neither Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC regulations, nor the stock exchange listing requirements
address whether Codes need to ensure confidentiality or anonymity for whistleblower reports
generally. Despite this lack of guidance, a majority of the company Codes claim that all
7

That said, Sarbanes-Oxley does prohibit retaliation against employees who report various types of financial
fraud. (18 U.S.C. s. 1514A)
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reports made by whistleblowers will be kept confidential (59.6%) and that all violations can
be reported anonymously (56.2%). That said, a quarter of the companies do not address
confidentiality (25.8%) or anonymity (27.0%). Another group of Codes only permit
confidentiality and anonymity in some cases – 14.6% and 16.9%, respectively. Indeed,
76.4% of the Codes state affirmatively that the company will investigate whistleblower
reports, and 27.0% state that they expect employees to cooperate with the investigation.
Perhaps the desire to investigate explains why 13.5% of the companies actually discourage
anonymity in reporting.
Whistleblower scholars take different views on the value of confidentiality and anonymity as
part of the whistleblowing process. Citing a study reporting a 20% decline in whistleblowing
after Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, Miceli, Near, & Dworkin assert that ‘there is scant evidence
that anonymity promotes whistle-blowing.’ (Miceli et al. 2008, p.158) They also cite a report
from a hotline provider that employee requests for anonymity have decreased from 78% to
48% in the past twenty years ‘as employees become more comfortable about reporting.’
(Miceli et al. 2008, p.158) Moreover, these same scholars note that anonymity and
confidentiality can cause numerous problems, including difficulty in following-up on reports of
wrongdoing and problems maintaining confidentiality under certain circumstances. (Miceli et
al. 2008, pp.158-59; Miceli & Near 1992, pp.74-76)
On the other hand, studies typically find that individuals are more likely to voice dissenting
views if they can do so anonymously. (Miethe 1991, pp.54-57; Sunstein 2003, p.20) This
research would predict that Codes that refuse to guarantee anonymity or at least
confidentiality may be less successful at encouraging whistleblowing.
The trend in the law seems to be to promote anonymity in order to encourage whistleblowers.
The primary example of this trend is Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that U.S. publicly-traded
corporations must provide a channel for employees to report financial fraud to the board of
directors anonymously. (15 U.S.C. s. 78f(m)(4)) Companies clearly have responded to this
requirement by instituting ways in which employees can make anonymous and confidential
reports.
In sum, despite little direction from U.S. statutory or regulatory law, companies in this study
seem to have developed whistleblower provisions for their Codes of Ethics that have
remarkable consistency. The provisions generally apply to all company employees, and
seem to require employees to report a broad range of misconduct to the company. The
Codes identify numerous potential recipients of a whistleblower’s report, including primary
and secondary contacts. In return, the Code provisions promise protection from retaliation
for employees who report violations of the code itself, the law, or even ethical violations.
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Additionally, companies consistently permit whistleblowers to remain anonymous or keep
their disclosures confidential.
Better Protections Than Statutory and Tort Law?
In addition to demonstrating that U.S. companies seemed to have reached a consensus
about the content and scope of their Code of Ethics’ whistleblower provisions, the study also
provides an opportunity to compare the retaliation protection provided by most companies
with the protections to whistleblowers afforded by U.S. law generally. That said, we
recognize that one of the study’s limitations is that it does not present any evidence of how
these whistleblower programs are implemented. This study examined what U.S. companies
tell the world – it does not provide much information regarding how things actually operate
inside the company. Finding a way to get at this ‘operational’ information would be an
important next step to examine how these whistleblower provisions effect a whistleblower’s
or potential whistleblower’s experience inside a U.S. corporation. However, even with this
limitation, the study can give some insight into how the combination of these provisions and
U.S. law might affect whistleblowers as a formal legal matter. In other words, knowing the
scope and extent of these protections allows us to make an argument that these provisions
should play some role in legally protecting whistleblowers. Assuming the law has some
impact on the behavior of both whistleblowers and corporations, this legal analysis should
have some practical impact on the whistleblower’s experience.
In fact, given the breadth and consistency of these whistleblower provisions, one conclusion
that could be drawn from these results is that U.S. corporate Codes of Ethics may better
protect whistleblowers from retaliation than statutory or tort law, two areas of law to which we
traditionally have looked to provide whistleblowers protection.

8

Statutory and tort

whistleblower protections in the United States contain numerous exceptions and loopholes.
(Miethe 1999, pp.147-48; Moberly 2008, pp.980-87) As the Senate noted when it passed
Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower provision, corporate whistleblowers were ‘subject to the
patchwork and vagaries’ of current law. (S. Rep. No. 107-146 2002, p.19) The corporate
Codes, however, across the board, fill these gaps in coverage. Indeed, the data from this
study paint a picture of whistleblower protections very different than the protections provided
by statute or tort. Companies appear to require more of themselves through their Codes than
U.S. law requires for protecting whistleblowers. We set forth three examples below.
Broader Definition of ‘Protected Conduct’

8

This section reviews and summarizes topics Moberly has addressed previously in Protecting Whistleblowers by
Contract, 79 COLO. L. REV. 975 (2008). The data from this study support and enhance the arguments he made in
that article.
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First, the Codes protect a wider variety of whistleblower reports than under current U.S. law.
Whistleblower protections in the private sector protect only a limited type of report about very
specific illegalities. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley protects only reports about certain types of
fraud (18 U.S.C. s. 1514A), while the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 protects
only whistleblower reports related to the safety of commercial vehicles (49 U.S.C. s.
31105(a)). Statutes addressing a specific topic, like nuclear power or clean water or
corporate fraud, often will attach a whistleblower provision protecting from retaliation
employees who report violations of that particular act. Despite having over 35 of these
individualized whistleblower and anti-retaliation statutes, in the U.S. there is no over-arching,
generalized whistleblower statute for employees who report any type of illegality or
wrongdoing. To be protected under a particular statute’s antiretaliation provision, an
employee must report the ‘right’ (i.e., protected) type of misconduct – a whistleblower who
reports something different, even if it is illegal, might fall through the gaps in the various
statutes’ protections. (Moberly 2008, pp.981-83)
A similar problem arises with state tort law. This type of law often provides a remedy for
whistleblowers who are fired – they can bring a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy. This tort protects employees who act ‘in the public interest’ by reporting
misconduct that the public would want reported. The gaps in this tort coverage, however, are
significant. (Westman & Modesitt 2004, p.131) Each of the U.S.’s fifty states has a different
definition of what an employee must report in order to be protected – in other words, state
courts define the ‘public policy’ that matters very differently from one another, and not always
in a way that is completely predictable. One judge’s public policy might appear to another
judge to be a private matter, such as petty internal corporate squabbling. (Estlund 1996,
p.1657; Moberly 2008, pp.984-86) Furthermore, because tort law is judge-made common
law, no official codification of the rules exist for employees to consult before blowing the
whistle and the courts’ holdings are subject to change on a case-by-case basis.
In short, in order to bring a claim for retaliation or wrongful discharge, an employee must
blow the whistle on the ‘right’ (meaning protected) type of conduct. This leads to landmines
for the unwary and a situation in which whistleblowers may have difficulty predicting ahead
of time whether they will be protected.
U.S. corporate Codes, however, differ from the current law because they appear to
encourage employees to report a much broader range of misconduct. Protecting reports of
illegal behavior generally (76.4% of Codes provide this protection) goes well beyond any
current statutory protections for reporting misconduct. Many companies go even further by
instructing employees to report violations of the Code (93.3%) as well as ‘unethical’ or
‘improper’ conduct (52.8%). Codes that speak broadly of reporting ‘illegal’ or ‘unethical’
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conduct may better protect whistleblowers and encourage reporting because whistleblower
will not have to worry about whether their report falls into the class of reports protected by a
particular statute. In fact, these broad provisions could stop what has become a common
occurrence in U.S. retaliation cases: the employer trying to demonstrate that what the
employee reported was not protected and the employee trying to fit his report into predefined legal boxes. Unwary employees inevitably get caught in a game of ‘gotcha’ after the
fact because too often the legal retaliation case focuses on whether the employee reported
the right type of misconduct, rather than focusing on whether the employer retaliated in
response to that report. (Moberly 2007, pp.113-20) The Codes’ broad definitions of what
should be reported would place the emphasis in retaliation cases where it should be: on
whether the employer retaliated against an employee based upon the employee blowing the
whistle.
More Consistent Protections
Second, the law differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from statute to statute regarding
other aspects of a whistleblower’s protection, such as the person to whom the whistleblower
reports. Some laws require a whistleblower to report internally first for certain types of
misconduct, others require external reports. (Westman & Modesitt 2004, p.143) Many allow
for either, but there is often uncertainty, particularly with some older federal statutes. For
example, in the most recent term of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court refused to decide
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act’s antiretaliation provision protected internal reports of
wrongdoing, leaving employees uncertain regarding whether they will be protected from
retaliation if they tell their manager or the company president about violations of the
minimum wage or overtime provisions of U.S. law. (Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics
Corp. 2011, p.1336)
By requiring company-wide policies for whistleblowers, the listing standards could avoid an
increasingly problematic situation: employees in the same company being provided with
different instructions as to whom they should give reports depending upon the state or
jurisdiction in which the employee is located. The company-wide policies would apply the
same standards to all company employees regardless of their physical location, and make it
clear that reporting internally is protected. Moreover, by identifying specific individuals, and
several different individuals, these corporate Codes give much better instruction to
employees than the more formal legal protections provided by statute and tort.
This information is even more valuable to the extent we believe employees do not know
about or understand their more formal legal protections and the intricacies and gaps those
involve. By contrast to the difficulty an employee may have traversing through the maze of
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federal and state legal protections, it appears that employees could easily find the
whistleblower provisions of a company’s Code. Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Section 406
clearly intended to make Codes of Ethics more publicly available by requiring their disclosure.
Only one of the ninety companies in the sample did not make the Code publicly available,
even in response to a specific request from the authors. Thus, it seems that Sarbanes-Oxley
and the SEC regulations fulfilled their purpose of having companies disclose their Codes of
Ethics publicly. An interested and diligent employee likely could find and read the
whistleblower provisions of a corporate Code in order to figure out how to report misconduct.
Good Faith Belief
Third, most whistleblower protection statutes and tort claims require a whistleblower to have
a ‘reasonable good faith belief’ that the misconduct the whistleblower reports actually
violates the law. (Moberly 2008, pp.1002-03) This standard, of course, means that the
whistleblower does not necessarily have to be right, but that the whistleblower’s belief must
be objectively reasonable and subjectively made in good faith. Problems can result from this
standard, however, because U.S. courts sometimes interpret this requirement strictly by
holding everyday lay employees to very high standards regarding their knowledge of the
intricacies of the law. (Moberly 2010, pp.448-51) For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 makes racial and sexual harassment illegal. (42 U.S.C. s. 2000e-2) However, one
instance of harassment typically is not ‘severe and pervasive’ enough to be illegal. (Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton 1998, pp.787-88) As a result, courts have not protected a
whistleblower from retaliation when he reported a single instance of harassment because he
could not have had a ‘reasonable belief’ that the conduct violated Title VII. (Jordan v.
Alternative Resources Corp. 2006, pp.339-43) Even if the employee reported the
harassment in good faith (meaning the employee truly believed the harassment violated the
law) – unless an objectively reasonable person would conclude that the wrongdoing violated
the law, the employee would not be protected.
Codes of Ethics seem to ignore this high legal standard of both subjective good faith and
objective ‘reasonable belief’ that what an employee reports violates the law. Instead,
corporations generally tell employees that they will be protected from retaliation as long as
they report misconduct in ‘good faith’; 76.4% of the companies use this language to describe
the type of report that must be made. Compare that statistic to the companies that use
language such as ‘employees will be protected who report what they reasonably believe to
be misconduct.’ Only 11.2% use that language, even though it would seemingly require
employees to be more certain about the misconduct they report. Instead, by using the
broader ‘good faith’ language, companies seem to encourage employees to report even
concerns about which they are less certain. However, companies rarely, if ever, explain what
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they mean by ‘good faith,’ which could mean either that the whistleblower has an ‘honest’
belief that what they report is true or it could mean that the whistleblower have a pure motive
in making the disclosure. Should it mean the later, whistleblowers might be deterred from
reporting if they know their motive will be questioned.
However, to the extent Codes focus on the subjective intent of the employee – the more
forgiving standard – Codes should better protect whistleblowers because courts should not
engage in an ex post evaluation of whether the conduct an employee reports actually
violated the law. That review can be tricky because events seem much clearer in hindsight
than they might to an employee who is trying to make a judgment call about whether
misconduct has occurred. Additionally, the line between illegal and legal might seem much
clearer to a legally-trained court than to a lay person on an assembly line, for example.
Corporations clearly have decided that they would rather have people report earlier and with
less information. This gives corporations the chance to investigate and to let the experts in
the corporation determine whether activities violate the law instead of relying on an individual
employee to decide whether conduct is sufficiently egregious to report.
To summarize these points, in several important ways, the non-retaliation promises
corporations make in their corporate Codes of Ethics offer employees broader and stronger
protection from retaliation than US statutory and tort law. This might encourage more
employees to report the misconduct they see, knowing that they will be protected by the
corporation’s promise. Indeed, other scholars have argued that internal whistleblowing
should increase under these circumstances, i.e., when a company provides a specific
channel for an employee disclosure, identifies a specific person to receive the disclosure,
and promises not to retaliate against an employee for disclosing misconduct. (Near &
Dworkin 1998, p.1557; Barnett et al. 1993, p.133; Miceli & Near 1992, p.290) This
conclusion, however, is undermined if employees cannot actually enforce these corporate
promises in court should the company breach their promise. In other words, can employees
rely on these Codes of Ethics’ promises? Will courts enforce them by giving damages to
employees who are retaliated against in violation of the promises?
Disclaimers May Undermine a Code’s Promise of Protection
The answer to those questions is ‘probably not.’ In a previous article, Moberly detailed
several reasons why a Code’s promise of protection from retaliation may be difficult to
enforce. (Moberly 2008, pp.1012-21) Here, we will briefly discuss one reason given the
results of this study.
Most U.S. workers are ‘at will’ employees. That is, employers can discharge employees at
any time, for any reason. Some exceptions to this background rule exist, but courts generally
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presume that employers have great discretion to fire employees. This presumption makes it
difficult for employees to enforce any type of employer promise, and, accordingly, the at-will
rule makes enforcing the types of antiretaliation promises found in Codes questionable.
One prominent exception to the at-will rule, however, is that many courts will enforce
promises found in employee handbooks. This doctrine has been developed in the last
several decades as a state law doctrine – usually under a theory of either breach of contract
or promissory estoppel – and today a majority of U.S. jurisdictions accept that at-will
employees may enforce some employee handbook provisions. (Dau-Schmidt & Haley 2007,
p.344)
Whistleblowers have tried to enforce antiretaliation promises in Codes of Ethics by equating
these Codes with employee handbooks. Courts have had little problem equating the two:
both Codes of Ethics and more detailed employee handbooks serve the same purposes of
informing employees about employer expectations and encouraging employee loyalty by
outlining the benefits employees gain by working for that particular employer. As a result,
some U.S. courts have upheld employee claims that they were fired in violation of the
antiretaliation promise in a Code of Ethics. However, this result is far from the norm, and in
fact it will very often be the case that courts refuse to enforce these promises, based on
several different legal doctrines. (Moberly 2008, pp.1012-21) Here, we will focus on the
primary reason: the existence of an at-will disclaimer.
Courts typically will not enforce handbook provisions if the handbook contains a ‘clear and
conspicuous’ disclaimer that proclaims the employment relationship to be at-will. (Fischl
2007, p.195) For example, a New York court dismissed an employee’s breach of contract
claim based upon a Code’s whistleblower provision because the company stated in the
Code that ‘[t]his code of conduct is not a contract of employment and does not contain any
contractual rights of any kind . . . [the company] can terminate employment at any time and
for any reason.’ (Lobosco v. New York Telephone Co./NYNEX 2001, p.464) Thus, an
employer’s ability to include a disclaimer reaffirming the employee’s at-will status could
undermine enforcement of a Code’s anti-retaliation provision.
We examined the extent to which companies in our study incorporated an at-will disclaimer
into the company Code of Ethics. Interestingly, at the same time that companies made
promises of non-retaliation, almost half of the companies (44.9%) also claimed that
employees are at-will. Companies do not publicize this at-will disclaimer anywhere but in the
Code itself. None of the companies put the at-will language on their Form 10 public filing with
the SEC or even on the website from which the Codes can be downloaded.
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Additionally, for the Codes that do not have at-will disclaimers, we speculate that other
employment materials likely have disclaimers somewhere – such as in an actual
employment handbook or some other document handed out to employees. This study does
not measure that, but it seems likely that the percentage of employees subject to an
unenforceable non-retaliation promise is even higher than 44.9%. And, those employees’
situation might be even worse: they have one document that clearly promises them
protection from retaliation, yet another document informs them that they are at-will
employees and therefore cannot rely on any promise made to them.

4. Limitations
This study’s methodology has benefits and drawbacks compared to the survey method used
by Hassink and Lewis & Kender. As a benefit, this study was not dependent upon
respondents to receive information, which makes the results less skewed by a non-response
bias. The listing requirements of the U.S. stock exchanges require public posting of
corporate Codes of Ethics, which provides a unique opportunity to examine the details of
corporate policy. A survey might produce results skewed in favor of strong whistleblowing
policies as companies with strong policies might respond readily, while those with weak
policies may not. Moreover, by reviewing the actual documents, as opposed to a
corporation’s description of the document, this study might present a less-biased view of the
contents of corporate whistleblowing policies (although it should be noted that many
respondents in the Lewis & Kender surveys sent the authors relevant documents or made
them available on their website). Finally, drawing the sample randomly also provides the
benefit of surveying a greater diversity of corporations than surveying only the largest
companies on a particular stock exchange or those who self-select by returning survey
materials.
On the other hand, by relying only on public documents and not a detailed questionnaire,
this study did not evaluate the manner in which companies actually implemented their Codes.
By using surveys of companies, Lewis & Kender were able to gather information about how
Codes were utilized and how companies trained their employees and supervisors. (D. Lewis
& Kender 2010, p.31) Additionally, companies may address whistleblowing issues in
documents not made public – such as in employee handbooks. This study did not have
access to those materials. Finally, several studies recently have tried to evaluate whether
Codes of Conduct are effective at reducing corporate misconduct, and the results of those
studies have been mixed. (Schwartz 2002, pp.27-28; Newberg 2005, pp.264-66) This study,
however, does not attempt to answer whether whistleblowing policies found in corporate
Codes are effective.
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All of these limitations could be addressed by further research. For example, surveys could
follow up on the information received as part of this study. Moreover, although it may be
difficult to structure, a study could attempt to determine whether whistleblowing policies
actually help reduce corporate wrongdoing.

5. Conclusion
In the book arising out of the previous International Whistleblower Research Network
conference, held in 2009, David Lewis outlined an ‘agenda for further research’ in which he
noted that ‘much of the existing research on the use and contents of employers’ confidential
reporting/whistleblowing procedures has tended to focus on the public sector and there is a
need to obtain more information about how whistleblowing is managed in the private sector.’
(Lewis 2010, p.163) The research described in this chapter provides an initial view of the
ways in which the private sector in the United States attempts to manage whistleblowing. We
found that, on paper at least, U.S. corporations have similar ways in which to encourage
employees to report misconduct. Companies make whistleblowing a duty of employment and
provide detailed instructions on how to blow the whistle internally. Numerous people in the
organization can receive employee reports. And, perhaps most importantly, companies
promise to protect whistleblowers from retaliation.
However, because of the strength of the at-will rule in the United States, employees will have
a difficult time enforcing these promises, particularly if companies continue to include
disclaimers in their Code of Ethics. These disclaimers essentially negate the companies’
promise to protect whistleblowers from retaliation. This result seems counter-productive and
ultimately, simply unfair. As the study shows, corporate Codes of Ethics make reporting a
duty - a requirement of employment. In fact, this requirement is one of the most consistent
provisions of these codes across the board: 96.6% tell their employees that they must report
misconduct. Protecting employees from retaliation – enforcing the promise made by almost
all corporations – is a simple matter of fairness. Companies should not be able to make
whistleblowing a job requirement, and then be permitted to retaliate when the employee
does exactly what the employee is told to do.
Further research is needed to examine how companies actually implement these policies.
Employees may have difficulty enforcing promises not to retaliate legally, but the practical
effects of such promises are still understudied. Now that we know the content and scope of
private sector whistleblower policies, attention needs to turn to how companies implement
these policies and whether they effectively encourage whistleblowing and reduce
misconduct.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1. Location of the Full Code
Form 10K or 10KSB
Company website
Annual report
Sent to a person who requests it

% of Codes
2.2%
85.4%
5.6%
43.8%

Table 2. Code Applicable To:
All employees
Subsidiaries/ Entire group
Officers/Senior/Exec. Management
Directors
Financial officers
Contractors
Former employees
Local application by subsidiaries

% of Codes
98.9%
53.9%
78.7%
82.0%
22.5%
25.8%
0.0%
0.0%

Table 3. Tone of Code
% of Codes
Reporting is a requirement/duty (e.g.,
employees ‘must’ or ‘should’ report
Employees are explicitly encouraged to report
Neutral tone about reporting (e.g., employees
‘can’ or ‘may’ report)

96.6%
36.0%
11.2%
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Table 4. Nature of the Violations to be Reported
Violations of code itself
Violations of law/other regulations
Unethical/improper conduct
Financial reporting problems
Failing to report violation
Criminal offenses
Health and safety threats
Environmental issues
Corruption/mismanagement/abuse of
authority
Misinformation (including on reports to
the
SEC
or
involving
other
government reporting requirements)
Miscarriage of Justice
Theft/misappropriation/misuse of
company assets
Insider trading/bribery/money
Laundering
Harassment or discrimination
Other violations, not mentioned†
Conflicts of interest
Conflicts of interest of others should
be reported
Employees should report their own
conflict of interest
States that conflicts should be
reported, but is vague on whose
conflict
Code does not mention conflicts of
interest

% of Codes
93.3%
76.4%
52.8%
65.2%
23.6%
3.4%
29.2%
7.9%
1.1%
15.7%
0.0%
22.5%
9.0%
21.3%
58.4%
4.5%
38.2%
52.8%
20.2%

Note. † Some examples of other violations include: ‘fraud’ (36.0%), ‘anti-trust violations’; ‘dishonest
conduct’; ‘tax violations’; ‘boycott requests’; or ‘infringing on copyrights, patents, or trademarks’.
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Table 5. Officials or Bodies To Whom Wrongdoing May Be Reported
% of Codes
As a Primary Contact
Direct or indirect supervisor
75.3%
Compliance or ethics officer
29.2%
Special hotline†
47.2%
Board of directors
16.9%
Audit committee
55.1%
Human resources department
33.7%
Legal department
36.0%
Corporate governance department
1.1%
Internal audit department
16.9%
Company secretary
2.2%
Risk management department
0.0%
Chief executive officer
19.1%
Chief financial officer
15.7%
Complaints committee
0.0%
Others to receive complaints
50.6%
As a Secondary Contact
Direct or indirect supervisor
0.0%
Compliance or ethics officer
2.2%
†
Special hotline
5.6%
Board of directors
2.2%
Audit committee
4.5%
Human resources department
3.4%
Legal department
4.5%
Corporate governance department
1.1%
Internal audit department
2.2%
Company secretary
1.1%
Risk management department
0.0%
Chief executive officer
4.5%
Chief financial officer
2.2%
Complaints committee
0.0%
Others to receive complaints
54.5%
Note. † We also coded for how the hotline was run. Of the 49 companies that mentioned hotlines,
rd
36.7% used a 3 party, 6.1% run it internally; and 57.1% did not provide this information.
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Table 6. Reporting Guidelines and Formalities
% of Codes
Code provided the contact details to
report misconduct
Code states that the contact details can
be found elsewhere
Reporting channels vary by
Type of misconduct being reported
Who is engaging in misconduct
Who is reporting the misconduct
The channels do not vary
Code identifies a separate contact for
reporting financial problems
Why a secondary contact should be used†
Report should be in sufficient detail to
permit an investigation
Specific details that should be reported
Reporting system is multilingual
A special reporting form should be used
A whistleblower should adequately
explain their suspicion
Code provides a checklist for criteria of
ethical behavior
Code
provides
a
graphical
representation of the reporting
system
Code bans employee investigation
Requires whistleblower to translate the
complaint into a specific language

66.3%
5.6%
56.2%
14.6%
18.0%
32.6%
49.4%
32.6%
18.0%
6.7%
3.4%
1.1%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
5.6%
0.0%

Note. † The reasons for reporting to a secondary contact clustered around five themes for the 29
Codes that provided reasons: because the employee felt ‘uncomfortable’ or wanted ‘anonymity’
(58.6%); the complaint was not handled ‘properly’ or the employee was not ‘satisfied’ with the
response from the primary contact (48.3%); the primary contact was not ‘appropriate’ or there were
difficulties with ‘communication’ (34.5%); the primary contact was absent (10.3%); or the report
involved a serious violation of the law (3.4%).
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Table 7. Protection from Retaliation and Qualification for Protection
% of Codes
‘No retaliation’ promise or Code
91.0%
prohibits retaliation
Retaliation will be punished
30.3%
Reports must be made in ‘good faith’
76.4%
Reports must be based on a
11.2%
‘reasonable belief’
Report must be of a genuine concern
3.4%
Report
can
included
‘suspected’
68.5%
violations
No retaliation even if the report is
3.4%
unfounded or factually untrue
Making a false or malicious report is
21.3%
punishable
Whistleblowers will have liability toward
0.0%
subject of malicious complaint
Involvement – immunity for reporting
0.0%
one’s own involvement
Involvement – protection only provided if
employee did not receive any
0.0%
personal gain from reported
misconduct
Involvement – disclosure will be credited
3.4%
if whistleblower is involved in
misconduct
Involvement – no retaliation even if
1.1%
whistleblower is involved in
misconduct but with good faith
Right of protection may be lost if report
0.0%
is made externally
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Table 8. Confidentiality and Anonymity
% of Codes
Some or all reports will be treated
confidentiality†
Report will be kept confidential, except as
required for investigation
Report will be kept confidential, except as
required by law or regulation
Company will make its ‘best efforts’ to
keep confidentiality or ‘to extent
reasonably possible’
Violations can be reported anonymously!
Anonymity is discouraged
Whistleblowers are not able to make their
concern publicly unless certain
conditions are met
Publicity is not permitted
No anonymity for third parties

74.2%
24.7%
19.1%
30.3%
73.1%
13.5%
0.0%
1.1%
0.0%

Note. † This number includes a combination of Codes in which all violations are guaranteed
confidentiality (59.6%) and some violations are guaranteed confidentiality (14.6%); ! This number
includes a combination of Codes in which all violations are guaranteed anonymity (56.2%) and some
violations are guaranteed anonymity (16.9%).

Table 9. Investigation Details
% of Codes
Company will investigate or give
serious
treatment
to
whistleblower disclosure
Cooperation
expected
of
employees in investigation
Company
will
keep
an
investigation log
Company will provide feedback on
investigation to employee

76.4%
27.0%
20.2%
12.4%

Table 10. At-Will Disclaimers
Form 10 contains an at-will disclaimer
Code contains an at-will disclaimer

% of Codes
0.0%
44.9%

